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Abstract
Background: Vast quantities of electronic data are collected about patients and service users as they pass
through health service and other public sector organisations, and these data present enormous potential for
research and policy evaluation. The Health Information Research Unit (HIRU) aims to realise the potential of
electronically-held, person-based, routinely-collected data to conduct and support health-related studies.
However, there are considerable challenges that must be addressed before such data can be used for these
purposes, to ensure compliance with the legislation and guidelines generally known as Information Governance.
Methods: A set of objectives was identified to address the challenges and establish the Secure Anonymised
Information Linkage (SAIL) system in accordance with Information Governance. These were to: 1) ensure data
transportation is secure; 2) operate a reliable record matching technique to enable accurate record linkage across
datasets; 3) anonymise and encrypt the data to prevent re-identification of individuals; 4) apply measures to
address disclosure risk in data views created for researchers; 5) ensure data access is controlled and authorised;
6) establish methods for scrutinising proposals for data utilisation and approving output; and 7) gain external
verification of compliance with Information Governance.
Results: The SAIL databank has been established and it operates on a DB2 platform (Data Warehouse Edition
on AIX) running on an IBM 'P' series Supercomputer: Blue-C. The findings of an independent internal audit were
favourable and concluded that the systems in place provide adequate assurance of compliance with Information
Governance. This expanding databank already holds over 500 million anonymised and encrypted individual-level
records from a range of sources relevant to health and well-being. This includes national datasets covering the
whole of Wales (approximately 3 million population) and local provider-level datasets, with further growth in
progress. The utility of the databank is demonstrated by increasing engagement in high quality research studies.
Conclusion: Through the pragmatic approach that has been adopted, we have been able to address the key
challenges in establishing a national databank of anonymised person-based records, so that the data are available
for research and evaluation whilst meeting the requirements of Information Governance.
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Background
Vast amounts of personal data are collected routinely by
health and social care systems in order to support clinical
management and patient care. The secondary use of this
data has enormous potential in health-related research,
quality improvement, service planning and enhanced
clinical decision-making [1]. In the UK, in common with
many countries worldwide, the benefits and cost-effi-
ciency potential of using routinely-collected data are
widely recognised. The UK Clinical Research Collabora-
tion (UKCRC) is a partnership of organisations working
to establish the UK as a world leader in clinical research
[2], and this includes a commitment to the use of elec-
tronic data within the bounds of data protection and con-
fidentiality [3]. The Health Information Research Unit
(HIRU) is an initiative developed by the School of Medi-
cine at Swansea University and it receives core funding as
part of the Welsh Assembly Government's commitment to
the UKCRC. The aim of HIRU is to realise the potential of
electronically-held, person-based, routinely-collected
information for the purposes of conducting and support-
ing health-related research. Furthermore, work is under-
way to develop a UK Health Informatics Platform under
the Office for the Strategic Co-ordination of Health
Research (OSCHR) E-Health Records Research Board [4],
and the work of HIRU represents the Welsh national com-
ponent of this system.
In establishing a databank containing person-based data,
it is imperative that methods are employed to ensure com-
pliance with the data protection legislation and confiden-
tiality guidelines comprising the NHS Information
Governance framework [5] (referred to in this paper as
Information Governance), so that the identity of individ-
uals is safeguarded at all stages of the process. Many coun-
tries have regulatory and legislative procedures that are of
particular relevance to this area of work and the UK is no
exception. The Data Protection Act of 1998 [6] enforces
the 1995 European Directive on Data Protection [7] and
is concerned with data that allow the identification of liv-
ing persons. This includes not only data that contain clear
personal identifiers, such as names, but also data that can
indirectly identify an individual [8]. The Caldicott report
[9] provides guidelines for the use of patient-identifiable
data, and these are of particular importance in National
Health Service (NHS) systems. A further safeguard is pro-
vided by the National Information Governance Board for
Health and Social Care (NIGB) [10] which oversees appli-
cations for the common law duty of confidentiality to be
set aside in specific circumstances, in accordance with Sec-
tion 251 of the NHS Act 2006 [11].
A common guiding principle is that person-identifiable
data should be anonymised before they are used for sec-
ondary purposes. Definitions of data anonymisation vary,
but those used within this paper are in accordance with
the Medical Research Council (MRC) guidance. This states
that: 'anonymised data are data prepared from information
from which the person to whom it relates cannot be identified.
The term is used when referring to robustly pseudonymised/
linked data or unlinked anonymised data' [12]. For a dataset
to be considered truly anonymous, there should be no
access within the organisation holding the dataset to any
key that could potentially join the anonymised data to a
person's identity. Other approaches encrypt confidential
identifiable data but allow decryption of the data through
the use of a controlled access key. While these processes
reduce the risk of identification, the robustness of the ano-
nymisation relies on data management processes to main-
tain the physical separation of the key from the data
within the same organisation.
However, anonymisation alone has been found to be
insufficient to address the confidentiality concerns of data
holders, in relation to person-based identity and organisa-
tional responsibilities. Similarly it cannot fully address
the potential for linkage attack in anonymised datasets
where researchers may have access to additional informa-
tion, or where details such as timed-events may be
accessed by researchers. A multi-faceted solution includ-
ing, anonymisation, data aggregation and/or suppression,
user authentication, scrutiny to ensure appropriateness of
the data use, and disclosure control at analysis and publi-
cation, is considered a more robust approach. This must
also be combined with responsible data utilisation on the
part of the researcher if it is to be effective in data protec-
tion. This paper describes the pragmatic multi-level
approach taken by HIRU to address the challenges in
establishing the SAIL databank for health research and




In order to address the challenges of building the SAIL
databank in accordance with Information Governance, a
set of objectives was identified. These were to:
1) Ensure data transportation is secure so that data are
not lost, or accessed without authorisation, during the
acquisition process
2) Operate a reliable record matching process so that
accurate anonymised record linkage can be carried out
3) Anonymise and encrypt the commonly-recognised
identifiable variables so that identifiable data are not
received by HIRUBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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4) Apply measures to control risk of disclosure in data
views created for researchers
5) Ensure data access is controlled and authorised to
enable responsible data utilisation
6) Establish methods for scrutinising proposals for
data utilisation and approving project outputs to con-
trol disclosure risk in results for publication
7) Gain external verification of compliance with Infor-
mation Governance.
Creating the databank
Initially HIRU conducted a pilot project in the local
authority area of Swansea in West Wales, in partnership
with the NHS (primary care general practices and second-
ary care hospitals) and social services organisations in the
area who agreed to provide their datasets. The purpose of
the pilot was to develop and refine methods of data
extraction, transportation, storage and analysis, to build a
prototype solution. It also enabled us to develop a formal
process for obtaining permission for data usage from each
participating organisation. Central to these developments
was the partnership formed with Health Solutions Wales
(HSW) which was integral to the design and operation of
the anonymisation and matching processes. HSW is an
NHS Wales organisation responsible for a wide range of
specialist information services including the collection,
management, and analysis of data held in a number of
national databases [13]. The pilot informed the further
development and refinement of technical specifications,
data access controls and the establishment of an inde-
pendent review process for data utilisation, to create an
operational databank for research.
External verification of compliance with Information
Governance was sought by inviting an independent inter-
nal audit to assess the SAIL system. RSM Bentley-Jennison
[14] an international company skilled and qualified to
provide Information Systems Assurance undertook the
work using a key controls audit framework. This was a
bespoke audit devised from the Control OBjectives for
Information and related Technology (COBIT) [15], the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [16], the Data Protection Act [6] and the NHS
Information Governance toolkit [17]. The audit was con-
ducted via a series of interviews and documentation
reviews, plus control checks to test the integrity of the sys-
tem. These checks were related back to the interviews and
were verified against policy documentation, Standard
Operating Procedures and computer code in use, to eval-
uate whether the controls in place were sufficient, and
whether they were being followed. The audit employed a
number of assessment areas: a) that all input is author-
ised, complete, accurate and timely; b) that controls exist
over access to the system and user rights and permissions;
c) the storage and retention arrangements; d) the disposal
arrangements; and, e) backup and restoration. A formal
report with findings and recommendations for improve-
ment was provided to HIRU following the audit.
We also carried out a wide consultation with government,
regulatory and professional agencies on the acceptability
of the system. This included: the Department for Public
Health and Health Professions (formerly the Department
of Health and Social Services Strategy), National Assem-
bly for Wales [18]; the Department for Children, Educa-
tion, Lifelong Learning and Skills (DCELLS), National
Assembly for Wales [19]; the Corporate Health Informa-
tion Programme (CHIP), National Assembly for Wales
[20]; the Office of the Information Commissioner [21];
Informing Healthcare (the national programme for NHS
IT in Wales) [22]; the National Research Ethics Service
(NRES) [23]; the National Public Health Service for Wales
(NPHS) [24]; the British Medical Association (BMA) [25];
the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) [26];
and other professional bodies. These consultations cov-
ered a range of issues, including the overall suitability of
the proposed system, and its potential to enhance e-
health research, to address policy objectives, to ensure
data protection and to provide value for money. They also
advised on requirements relating to ethical approval for
the establishment of the databank and for subsequent
research, and on issues of public interest and appropriate
data usage. This informed further improvements and
resulted in approval for roll-out of the system across
Wales. We obtain formal permission for data usage from
each participating organisation via their Caldicott Guard-
ians and Information Governance structures.
Results
Addressing the objectives
The following is a brief summary of how the objectives
were addressed in the development of the databank.
Fuller details of the processes underpinning these
approaches are described later.
1) Ensuring the security of data transportation was
achieved by data providers splitting their datasets at
source so that personal data were transported separately
from clinical data, and by the use of HTTPS via the NHS
Wales National Switching Service for secure data transfers.
2) A matching algorithm (MACRAL) was developed so
that reliable anonymised record linkage could be carried
out across multiple datasets. Through this method we
have achieved consistently efficient matching results with
specificity values >99.8%, and sensitivity rates between
95% and 100% for a variety of datasets [27].BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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3) A process for the anonymisation and encryption of the
commonly-recognised identifiable variables was devel-
oped, and this is carried out by HSW as a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) so that HIRU does not receive any identifiable
data. Further data processing at HIRU, including aggrega-
tion, masking and second-level encryption provide addi-
tional security measures.
4) An algorithm was developed to control the risk of dis-
closure in data views created for researchers by assessing
the level of unique and low-copy number records in the
view. This informs further aggregation and/or suppression
of particular variables or whole records in the data view.
5) Data access control methods were developed and these
operate through a combination of physical and permis-
sion-based restrictions and authorisations.
6) A Collaboration Review System, including an inde-
pendent Information Governance Review Panel, was
established to assess the appropriateness of requests to use
the data, and of project results before publication.
7) An independent internal audit was commissioned to
assess overall compliance with Information Governance
and to gain recommendations for improvement.
Operation of the SAIL system
Through the range of approaches adopted, a databank of
anonymous person-based records has been successfully
established. It operates on a DB2 platform (Data Ware-
house Edition on AIX) running on an IBM 'P' series Super-
computer: Blue-C [28]. A diagrammatic representation of
the SAIL system and control measures in place is shown in
Figure 1. The ways in which the approaches were imple-
mented and now operate are illustrated below by setting
out the journey of a dataset from its source to the SAIL
databank, and from the databank to utilisation by
researchers.
From data source to databank
HIRU receives anonymised datasets from a wide variety of
sources connected with health and well-being so that they
can be used in record-linkage research. HIRU supports
data providers going through a process of due diligence so
they are assured of the robustness of the SAIL system
before committing to provide their data. This includes
engaging in discussions with the data providers and
ensuring they have the opportunity to ask any questions
for clarification, and have all the information they require
in order to consider providing data to SAIL via their organ-
isational management structures. All data received by
HIRU are subject to the process outlined below.
At the Data Providing Organisation (DPO)
HIRU has put in place formal documented agreements
with DPOs so that the Information Governance require-
ments of providing the data are met. Initially the DPO
identifies from their dataset a system-linking field that can
be applied to each individual within their database to act
as a unique identifier. This may be an existing field or one
generated explicitly for this purpose. The DPO then sorts
their data into two distinct categories: demographic data
and clinical data. In this context, the term demographic
data covers the commonly-recognised personal identifi-
ers: name, address, postcode, date of birth and gender;
and clinical data covers data relating to events, diagnoses,
measures, interventions and outcomes, etc. When the two
data entities have been defined, the DPO generates output
data files assigning the unique system-linking field to each
individual in the demographic dataset and to each corre-
sponding row in the clinical dataset. The aim of this split-
file approach is to enable the removal of the commonly-
recognised identifiers from a dataset, and to replace them
with a unique, non-identifiable data item, so that data
linkage can take place at the individual record level with-
out any identifiable information passing from one organ-
isation to another. The resulting output is two distinct
data files each carrying the common key to enable them to
be rejoined. These are referred to as File_1 (demographic
data) and File_2 (clinical data). A secure HTTPS-based
data transportation system was developed to operate
across the digital all Wales network and the wider internet,
using the NHS Wales National Switching Service (NSS).
The NSS utilises secure web services for the transportation
layer and end point authentication and authorisation,
and controls the onward routing and the workflow under
pinning the agreed process. In this way File_1 is trans-
ferred to HSW who act as the trusted third party (TTP) for
the anonymisation process; File_2 is securely transferred
directly to HIRU, thus ensuring that no one party other
than the DPO itself ever has access to both demographic
and clinical data files.
At Health Solutions Wales (HSW)
HIRU works in collaboration with HSW who carry out
anonymisation of the demographic data. HIRU and HSW
have implemented a series of steps to enable successful
anonymisation, namely: matching, encryption, plus De-
Identification And Standardisation (DIAS).
The matching process ensures that an anonymised identi-
fier is assigned consistently to each individual in the data
file. It relies on the use of the MACRAL (Matching Algo-
rithm for Consistent Results in Anonymised Linkage)
algorithm developed by HSW, using the five variables:
first name, surname, postcode, date of birth and gender in
the matching process. The methodology and accuracy ofBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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The SAIL databank system Figure 1
The SAIL databank system. This diagram shows the SAIL databank system and the controls in place for data acquisition 
and utilisation, with an indication of the roles carried out by each party. Beginning at the base of the diagram, HIRU has formal 
agreements with data providers to provide their data to the databank in accordance with Information Governance. The com-
monly-recognised identifiers are anonymised at HSW, who provide a trusted third party service to HIRU. Further processes of 
masking and encryption are carried out at HIRU, and the SAIL databank is constructed. The SAIL databank operates on a DB2 
platform (Data Warehouse Edition on AIX) running on an IBM 'P' series Supercomputer: Blue-C. From the top of the diagram, 
requests to use the data are reviewed by HIRU and an independent Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP) to assess 
compliance with Information Governance, SOPs and data management policies, and to consider potential disclosure risk, 
before access can be agreed. Once this is agreed, a data view is created by HIRU technical staff, and access to this view can be 
made available. For this to happen, further data transformations are carried out to control the risk of disclosure, and the data 
user signs an access agreement for responsible data utilisation, in accordance with the policies in place and the specifications of 
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the matching process is the subject of another paper [27].
Consistent encryption of the output of the matching proc-
ess, using a method based on the Blowfish algorithm [29],
generates a result referred to as the Anonymous Linking
Field (ALF). This becomes the individual's unique anony-
mous identifier and it remains the same for a given indi-
vidual irrespective of the data source or DPO. The DIAS
process takes the remaining fields in the demographic
data file and aggregates them into categories, as necessary,
to generalise potentially identifying characteristics whilst
maintaining a sufficient level of detail to allow meaning-
ful analysis to be conducted. During this phase the post-
code is translated into a Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)
code (a small area code used by Ordnance Survey [30]),
the date of birth is masked using an algorithm to generate
a week of birth identifier, and the incoming gender codes
are replaced by a standard numerical format. The final
stage is to produce an output file containing just the DPO
generated system linking field, the categorised data and
the Anonymous Linking Field (ALF). This is known as
File_3 (anonymised demographics) and it is securely
transferred directly to HIRU.
At HIRU
HIRU receives data files from DPOs (File_2) and HSW
(File_3) and then loads the incoming data into a secure
staging area. From here the two files are recombined and
built into a normalised base layer, using a bespoke data
receipting and handling system, where further processing
takes place to ensure integrity and anonymity are main-
tained. The first process involves the application of an
incremental batch number to the entire incoming data set.
This batch number serves two main functions. Firstly, it
allows all data items for an individual dataset to be iden-
tified. This is important when a DPO sends regular data
transmissions of new data, and when data from multiple
DPOs may reside in a single database table. Secondly, it
ensures that the demographic and clinical data can always
be joined accurately. By including the batch number as a
predicate in the SQL statement alongside the DPO gener-
ated system-linking field, the data will always link accu-
rately at an anonymised individual level regardless of how
the DPO assigns their system linking field values to indi-
viduals over time.
The second process involves the encryption of the HSW
generated ALF to produce the ALF-E (Anonymous Linking
Field - Encrypted) and of the DPO generated system link-
ing field. This process is known as second level encryption
and it ensures analysts from within HIRU and HSW can
safely query the SAIL databank without being able to
decrypt any data or identify individuals in the DPO's envi-
ronment through cross-linkage to source datasets. The
SAIL databank forms the final layer of the data warehouse,
and this is the area that contains the data that are made
available for analysis via the creation of data views. Link-
age within the SAIL databank is generated through two
factors: firstly the encrypted DPO-generated system-link-
ing field which enables the data files provided by a given
DPO (File_2 and File_3) to be joined together; and sec-
ondly through the ALF-E, which enables datasets across
disparate DPOs to be linked at an anonymised individual
level. The stages from data source to databank, showing
the split-file approach, are illustrated in Figure 2.
From databank to utilisation by researchers
Data within the SAIL databank are compiled into views
for each individual research project, and these may con-
tain extracts from several datasets, linked anonymously at
the individual record level. Before data views are made
available to researchers they will have been subjected to
further safeguards to ensure anonymity is protected, and
access is only granted in accordance with strict controls
and authorisations. Requests for data are assessed via a
Collaboration Review System (CRS), which comprises
review by the HIRU team and by an independent Informa-
tion Governance Review Panel (IGRP). Review by the
HIRU team includes assessing data availability, resource
requirements and feasibility of the proposal, and review
by the IGRP is to ensure the appropriateness of the request
with respect to Information Governance. This is separate
to the scientific peer-review process and review by a
research ethics committee.
The IGRP was constituted to include representatives from
Informing Healthcare [22], the National Research Ethics
Service [23], the National Public Health Service for Wales
[24], the British Medical Association [25] and Involving
People [31]. Together with HIRU, the IGRP assesses each
proposal for compliance with Information Governance
and with a suite of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
and data management policies. The potential for disclo-
sure risk at this stage is considered by the HIRU team and
by the IGRP, based on knowledge and custodianship of
the datasets, before access can be agreed. The IGRP is pro-
vided with a copy of the proposal, completed by the
researcher, and members make use of the CRS documen-
tation which sets out the terms of reference and provides
proformas for review. The views of the IGRP are open to
the members of the panel and to the HIRU team, and are
available on request to applicants and other relevant par-
ties with an interest in the particular proposal. Members
of the panel are free to seek external advice if additional
expertise is required in the review process. The IGRP is
empowered to request amendments, or to deny requests,
if they find them not in compliance with Information
Governance. In this way, although HIRU is the data custo-
dian, there is shared control over access to, and utilisation,
of the data.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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Further safeguards are needed before the data view is
made available to any end user for analysis. Key data char-
acteristics such as the ALF-E and the system-linking field
undergo further encryption and the degree of uniqueness
within the data view is assessed quantitatively by the
NEMO (Numerical Evaluation of Multiple Outputs) algo-
rithm. NEMO is an SQL-based algorithm developed by
HIRU that counts the occurrences of unique and low-copy
number records in data views prepared for study. It allows
the judicious application of further aggregation and/or
suppression as necessary to minimise the risk of potential
disclosure. It does not automate the process as the specific
measures applied depend on the variables requested and
the particular project. For example, age may be aggregated
into 5 year bands, LSOA codes can be masked, and rare
records can be excluded or aggregated into categories. Any
proposed amendments that would affect the data view
(such as a request for additional variables) or risk poten-
tial disclosure are brought to the IGRP, and project out-
comes are requested for scrutiny by this panel before
publication as a final safeguard.
Data access is subject to stringent controls to ensure that
data utilisation complies with Information Governance.
Authorised data users are assigned an individual and
time-limited logon to access only their data view. Data
access is location-specific and only available via desig-
nated PCs (secure terminals) which are physically secured
to their position and do not have facilities to allow data to
be transferred out: they are not internet enabled, and the
USB ports and CD drive are disabled. All products of anal-
ysis (methodology, scripts, data & results) are securely
transferred from these secure terminals to the HIRU data
haven, which is an access-controlled drive for authorised
users only, using Novell® NetStorage. All statistical out-
puts are scrutinised by the HIRU team prior to release to
researchers. This manual review is carried out by the HIRU
senior data analyst and the professor of public health,
making use of the Office of National Statistics [32] guid-
ance on disclosure control. Generally, where there are
found to be numbers of events less than 5 per unit of anal-
ysis, methods are applied to suppress and/or generalise
the data. Data users are required to sign an access agree-
ment that they will behave responsibly and comply with
all policy and security measures in place before they are
provided with the user account. It is worth noting that
HIRU staff are also subject to stringent data access condi-
tions. They are also required to sign the data access agree-
Stages from data source to databank Figure 2
Stages from data source to databank. Data providers split their datasets at source into two parts: demographic data 
(File_1) and clinical data (File_2). File_1 is transferred to Health Solutions Wales for anonymisation and assignment of the 
Anonymous Linking Field (ALF). This is transferred to HIRU as File_3. File_2 is transferred directly from the data provider to 
HIRU. A join-key assigned by the data provider allows File_2 and File_3 to be joined at HIRU to build the SAIL databank.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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ment and to behave responsibly with the data in the
course of their work. This includes technical staff and
database administrators.
Independent Internal Audit
The findings of the Information Governance audit were
favourable and concluded that the SAIL systems provide
adequate assurance that risks material to the work of
HIRU are adequately managed and controlled. There were
four recommendations for improvement: none were fun-
damental, two were significant and two merited attention.
All the recommendations have been addressed success-
fully. The areas of assessment were designated a) to e) in
the methods section. Under assessment area b) it was rec-
ommended (merits attention) that management should
ensure that a procedure for the transfer of data from the
research terminals to individual PCs is developed and
implemented. This was addressed by setting up secure
transfer to a data haven on an access-controlled drive (as
described above). Under assessment area d) it was recom-
mended (significant) that management should develop a
disposal policy as part of the data security framework for
the SAIL system. This has been developed and imple-
mented. Under assessment area e) it was recommended
that the backup frequency to the data haven should be
increased (significant), and that backup tapes for the DB2
database should be stored in a fire-proof safe away from
the machine room (merits attention). The backup fre-
quency has been increased with a clear schedule in place,
and tapes are stored securely away from the machine
room. The database is now backed up to magnetic tapes
every evening and the database can be recovered to any
point in time during the last two months. The results of
the internal audit provided independent assurance to
demonstrate that the systems operating in the SAIL data-
bank meet the requirements of Information Governance.
We are currently preparing to invite Bentley-Jennison to
return to review the changes we have implemented fol-
lowing their recommendations. Audits are to be con-
ducted once a year, but their frequency is also dependent
on relevant changes to legislation and regulations and any
significant changes we make to our systems. This external
scrutiny is important to demonstrate the robustness of the
system and to support the confidence of data providers
and researchers.
Datasets incorporated
The SAIL databank already holds over 500 million ano-
nymised person-based records from numerous sources
with continual growth in progress. These include data
from: Welsh national screening programmes and the can-
cer registry, registers of births and deaths, national com-
munity child health, emergency services, primary care
general practices, secondary care hospitals (in-patients,
out-patients, day cases, A&E attendances, pathology
results) and social care. Many of these datasets are Wales-
wide (approximately 3 million population) and further
discussions are underway to expand the databank in types
of dataset, the range of organisations providing data and
increased geographical coverage. As part of this work,
datasets on educational attainment are also being
included to allow studies of the wider determinants of
health and well-being. In addition to these sources of
data, the SAIL databank also incorporates datasets gener-
ated through primary data collection as part of research
studies. These datasets undergo the same processes as
datasets from DPOs to ensure anonymity of research par-
ticipants. This adds high quality detailed datasets in spe-
cific areas and, with the potential for anonymous record
linkage, it enables long-term follow-up of longitudinal
cohorts. A list of the datasets held to date is included in
Table 1.
Utility of the databank
The utility of the databank is demonstrated by increasing
engagement in high quality research studies, and we aim
to make this resource as available to researchers as possi-
ble. Initially HIRU team analysts played an active part in
most studies, preparing data views for researchers, but
increasingly studies are commencing which include skills
and resources for routine data analysis. There are now
numerous studies where the data are being used in a vari-
ety of ways, and three examples are given here. 1) The data
are being used in the development of cohorts in a study
funded by the Medical Research Council on ankylosing
spondylitis (AS). This project is linking clinical data from
rheumatologists (diagnosis, MRI/radiograph images)
with existing routinely collected datasets such as the gen-
eral practice records, hospital data (out-patients clinical
data, in-patients, Accident & Emergency, laboratory/
pathology data) and social services databases as well as
data collected directly from the patients themselves (dis-
ease activity, function, quality of life, work limitations).
The aim of the study is to develop and characterise a
cohort of people with AS in Wales. 2) The data are being
utilised to highlight public health improvements, such as
through the work of the UK public health centre of excel-
lence (DECIPHer) funded by the UKCRC. The DECIPHer
centre studies inter-related issues and takes a multi-disci-
plinary approach to developing, testing, evaluating and
implementing public health interventions. SAIL contrib-
utes to this work by linking health and non-health data-
sets, for example, by providing analyses which use
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to relate the
nature of the built environment to body mass index and
obesity, by anonymous linkage to general practice data. 3)
The data are contributing to the evaluation of national
policy, such as the Welsh Assembly Government's Free
School Breakfast Initiative (FSBI) funded by the Wales
Office of Research & Development. FSBI will include link-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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age of nutrient and dietary intake data with education
databases to explore relationships between diet and fac-
tors including: free school meal entitlement, Standard
Assessment Tests (SATs) results and General Certificate of
Secondary Education (GCSE) performance data; plus link-
age to LSOA, census and health and social care databases.
The aim is to allow a series of research questions to be
addressed to assess the impact of the FSBI on cognitive
outcomes and attitudes to diet, including a consideration
of social factors.
The continuing development of the SAIL databank is
clearly supported by the increasing numbers and types of
DPOs who provide their datasets, and of researchers seek-
ing to utilise the SAIL datasets in high quality studies. It is
further endorsed by the involvement of national agencies,
such as Health Solutions Wales, the National Public
Health Service for Wales and Informing Healthcare, who
engage with HIRU on continuing developments.
Discussion
Observations on the SAIL system
The SAIL databank has been developed through a prag-
matic approach, using a range of methods to develop a
holistic multi-level solution that combines technical proc-
esses, control measures, authorisations and accountabil-
ity. The decision to establish the SAIL system on a central
architecture model, rather than a distributed architecture
model, was made because of a number of factors. These
were that: many of the existing IT systems in health and
social care settings were old and some were unstable;
identity management, anonymisation and record-linkage
would be far more problematic if attempting to operate in
real time; there were unknown issues relating to data qual-
Table 1: Datasets held in the SAIL databank
Dataset Geographical Coverage Data period
From To
All Wales Injury Surveillance System (AWISS) Morriston A&E, Swansea





General Practice Clinical Systems Individual practice level across Wales 1993 2008
General Practice Out of Hours Service Swansea & nearby areas 2005 2008
National Community Child Health Database (NCCHD) Wales 1987 2007
National Pupil Database Wales 2003 2008
NHS Administrative Register Wales 1960 2007
NHS Direct Wales calls Wales 2006 2008
NHS Hospital admissions













Pathology Morriston Hospital, Swansea





Social Services PARIS database Swansea local authority area 2003 2007
Screening Services Wales 1990 for cervical screening
1989 for breast screening
Aug 2008
Aug 2008
Welsh Cancer Intelligence and Surveillance Unit 
(WCISU)
Wales 1990 2006
This table provides a list of the datasets currently held in the SAIL databank. It can be seen that many of the datasets are national in coverage. 
Where datasets are held only on a regional level at this stage, this is because data collection began with the Swansea area, and plans are underway 
to extend collection across Wales in due course.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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ity; there were varying degrees of organisational readiness
and resources; and, it was more acceptable to DPOs to
provide their anonymous data to SAIL, than for SAIL to
plug into their systems and extract data as required. In
addition, there were various factors that contributed to the
overall rationale for adopting this particular design of cen-
tral architecture and mode of operation, the main ones
being: timeliness; computing capacity; cost; robust data
security; reliable matching for accurate record linkage;
and, the disparate nature of IT systems in health and social
care. Timeliness was a factor of particular importance, as
adopting this architecture has enabled the SAIL databank
to be established at this time. Other architectures may be
possible in the future, but this approach has enabled the
creation of an e-health research platform in compliance
with Information Governance without further delay,
whilst still retaining the opportunity to adopt new meth-
ods in the future. Considerable computing capacity is
required to accommodate the vast quantities of data. The
cost of establishing suitable hardware would have been
prohibitive, but for the availability of the Blue-C Super-
computer at Swansea University. In establishing any data-
bank with person-based records, data protection is of
paramount importance, and the SAIL databank has been
established to be anonymous. This was achieved through
the methods described in this paper, via partnership with
HSW, so that HIRU does not receive any identifiable data,
and so that the data are secure at all stages of the process.
The additional measures operated by HIRU are designed
to provide further safeguards for data security. A reliable
data matching process is essential so that accurate record-
linkage can take place. This is mediated by HSW who pro-
vide HIRU with the ALF, and this enables reliable record-
linkage at the individual level, even across disparate data-
bases from data providers with widely differing types of IT
systems. The combination of these factors led to the
choice of system that has been established.
It is acknowledged that the individual methods are not
necessarily new, but together they provide a system of
mutually-reinforcing safeguards to operate the databank
in accordance with Information Governance. It is also
acknowledged that our approaches could be enhanced
and that technical improvements could be made in cer-
tain aspects of the work to enhance efficiency, particularly
as demand to use the data increases. It has been proposed
(in the US) that there should be a national framework for
the secondary use of health data [33], and a similar frame-
work is being developed in the UK under the OSCHR E-
Health Records Research Board. A structure such as this
would most usefully comprise multiple methods to
ensure data security and responsible data utilisation, to
encompass the full spectrum of risks involved in the re-
use of routine data. As well as risks due to data processing,
levels of anonymisation, and possible disclosure, issues
relating to responsible custodianship, control of the data
and transparency would also be addressed to create a
holistic governance framework. This sort of multi-faceted
approach has been the guiding principle in the develop-
ment of the SAIL databank to date, whilst recognising the
need to continue incorporating further improvements
with the rapid developments in the field of health infor-
matics, and to retain the flexibility to respond to possible
political changes and new legislation and regulations.
Good working relationships with DPOs are an integral
part of the success to date in establishing the databank.
This has been motivated by goodwill and the desire to see
their data put to good secondary uses within the bounds
of Information Governance. Initially some data providers,
understandably, had concerns about loss of ownership
and control of their data. Opportunities are provided for
these issues to be discussed when the DPOs are invited to
take part, and all required information is provided to
them as part of supporting the due diligence process. It is
encouraging that fuller knowledge of the process allays
these concerns, as evidenced by the numerous DPOs who
have agreed to provide their data to SAIL. There are also
additional benefits to DPOs, through the receipt of sum-
mary reports on their datasets, which may help them
improve data quality and completeness.
Other challenges
As well as the challenges in establishing the databank in
accordance with Information Governance, a significant
additional challenge lies in the widely varying data for-
mats and systems in use, with differing semantic and tech-
nology architectures, and these can sometimes preclude
the process of data acquisition. HIRU is already able to
work with many types of dataset, and the Blue-C Super
Computer has been fully enabled for GIS data and it sup-
ports a variety of data mining techniques. Developing the
technologies to enable further disparate types of data to be
received is an on-going process for HIRU. Continuing
challenges also exist in data quality and consistency, as
datasets may be incomplete and coding may be highly
variable. These issues must be addressed as they can add
significantly to the workload in processing the data and
pose considerable challenges for data analysis. Where they
cannot be resolved effectively, one solution is to seek to
influence the data landscape so that it moves towards
using more standardised principles of data management.
Such developments towards greater consistency would
help address the problem at the data source. This is an
important area of work for agencies such as Informing
Healthcare and HIRU is actively engaged with them in this
process.
In continuing to expand the databank, various factors
need to be taken into account to ensure the scalability ofBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:157 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/157
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the system. Although different architectures may need to
be considered in order to improve our systems, we have
no anticipated problems with computational capacity for
including additional types of dataset on a Wales-wide
basis. More likely barriers to scalability are the ultimately
limited numbers of new types of DPOs, beyond health
and social care, and the organisational issues that may
influence agreements to provide data to SAIL. However,
success has been achieved in securing data on educational
attainment, and the matching process that has been devel-
oped (with assignment of the ALF) enables record-linkage
across these datasets, as well as those originating in health
and social care settings. A similar process has been devel-
oped for anonymising residential information, whereby
each dwelling is assigned a Residential Anonymous Link-
ing Field (RALF) [34], allowing health-related GIS studies
to be conducted. A further consideration in expanding the
databank beyond health and social care is of the need for
a suitable Trusted Third Party to carry out matching and
anonymisation. HSW currently provide this service to
HIRU, and as long a suitable gold standard reference data-
set is available, HSW would be well-placed to continue
this collaboration if more disparate datasets from other
sectors are included in the future.
Future work
Plans for the future development of SAIL are developed in
collaboration with the National Assembly for Wales,
Informing Healthcare and the IGRP. Future areas of work
for HIRU are to further improve our methods, to continue
to expand the databank and to increase our engagement
in high quality research. HIRU is currently developing a
secure Remote Access System for researchers wishing to
use the data. Various models for health-related data are
described in the literature [35] and we plan to test the
functionality and acceptability of different models for the
utilisation of the data by the research community. We are
also currently developing a method for secure anonymous
data transfer to authorised studies, where the appropriate
permissions and consent are in place, and the request is
approved by the IGRP.
There is considerable recent work in the literature on the
development of enhanced quantitative metrics [36,37]
and statistical models [38,39] to address disclosure risk in
anonymised data made available for users, and we plan to
explore the potential of such systems to improve our
processing efficiency and our ability to quantify disclosure
risk in data views created for researchers. The landscape of
health informatics is changing, such that new systems of
distributed architecture and federated databases are being
promoted and introduced. The UK Health Informatics
Platform is to be developed on these principles, and HIRU
is engaging in these developments as part of the expan-
sion of the databank. Models for consideration include
data grid systems, similar in principle to those that have
been established in the field of bioinformatics [40,41].
Another model of interest is MILA (Multi-Institutional
Linkage & Anonymisation) which is a technology-inde-
pendent methodology for the sharing of distributed data,
that can be implemented through any suitable combina-
tion of transmission and encryption technologies. Explicit
demonstrators of this method are the Scottish Family
Health Study (SFHS, a national family-based genetics
study) [42] and the Scottish Diabetes Research Network
[43]. SFHS distributes phenotype, genotype, demograph-
ics, identity and routine healthcare data over multiple
independent institutions for improved governance. MILA
includes an executive authority to oversee the governance
of the system as well as technical systems to retrieve and
link data from disparate sources.
Conclusion
The potential for the secondary use of routinely-collected
data is widely recognised internationally, including
within the UK where it is actively promoted by profes-
sional and regulatory bodies. However, appropriate safe-
guards must be implemented so that these data can be
accessed and used for research whilst data protection is
upheld. Through the methods that have been developed
and implemented, a large-scale and growing databank has
been successfully established for research and service
development initiatives, whilst complying with the
requirements of Information Governance. The volume
and breadth of data in the SAIL databank hold great
promise as a national resource for research, and as the
Welsh component of the developing UK Health Informat-
ics Platform.
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